NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Court will hold a hearing on Julie Hiatt Steele’s Motion For Continuance on Friday, March 12, 1999 at 9:00 a.m.

DATED: March 5, 1999

Julie Hiatt Steele, through undersigned counsel, respectfully requests that the Court continue trial of this matter until April 26, 1999, or the first available date thereafter, due to irreconcilable scheduling conflicts on the part of undersigned counsel. In support of her Motion, Ms. Steele relies on the accompanying Memorandum of Law.

DATED: March 5, 1999

Julie Hiatt Steele, through undersigned counsel, respectfully requests that the Court continue the trial of this matter approximately thirty (30) days until April 26, 1999, or until the first available date thereafter. Continuance is necessary because undersigned counsel must appear for a criminal trial before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, U.S. v. Pin Yen Yang, et al., No. 1:97-CR-288 ("Ohio Matter").

Trial of the Ohio Matter will commence on March 22, 1999, and is estimated by the Court and the government to last approximately four weeks. The judge in that matter, the Hon. Peter C. Economus, has been advised of the conflict, and has indicated that he will contact this Court to assure the Court of the estimated length of trial. The Office of Independent Counsel ("OIC") opposes the requested relief, although it has declined to provide any reason for its opposition.

In support of her Motion, Ms. Steele states as follows.

Ms. Steele was arraigned on January 19, 1999. At arraignment, undersigned counsel advised the Court of a potential conflict between the trial of this matter and the Ohio Matter, which was then scheduled for trial on March 18, 1999. A trial date of March 30, 1999 was selected by counsel in the hope that the Ohio Matter would resolve itself prior to that date. Unfortunately, that has not occurred, and the trial of that matter has been firmly set for March 22, 1999, and is anticipated to last four weeks.

The Ohio Matter has been pending since September 1997, when the defendants in that matter were arrested. Since their arrest, the defendants, who are citizens of Taiwan and Chinese-speaking, have been held in home pretrial detention. The case involves a complex indictment, the first charging economic espionage under 18 U.S.C. § 2315 to go to trial ever, which has required a complicated motion and discovery process. The trial date in the Ohio Matter has been set since November 1998.

Undersigned counsel represents both the defendant corporate entity and the individual owner. The defendants are charged in a twenty-one count indictment involving economic espionage, mail and wire fraud, money laundering and conspiracy. There are two attorneys who represent a co-defendant in the matter, and three government lawyers prosecuting the matter -- all of whose schedules must be coordinated.

Undersigned counsel was retained in the Ohio Matter in October, 1998, and has spent the last five months familiarizing themselves with the voluminous factual and legal record and litigating pretrial motions, as well as engaging in substantive discussions with the government regarding a plea agreement. Numerous pretrial and evidentiary issues are still outstanding, and will continue to be litigated over the course of the next two weeks in anticipation of the March 22, 1999 beginning of trial. Trial of the Ohio Matter entails the creation of a "satellite office" in Youngstown, Ohio given the voluminous factual record, much of which is in Mandarin Chinese. Undersigned counsel is setting up computer and other support systems in Youngstown that must be in place by March 20, 1999, as much of the presentation of evidence will be electronic.

Undersigned counsel represents Ms. Steele on a pro bono basis, and Ms. Steele would otherwise utilize court-appointed counsel. The attorneys that have worked on this case have volunteered their time to assist Ms. Steele and Ms. Luque in the representation of Ms. Steele. The trial team in the Ohio Matter is identical to the attorneys involved in the matter before the Court.

An approximately thirty-day continuance of the trial of this matter, from March 30, 1999 to April 26, 1999, or the soonest available date thereafter, is in the interests of justice. Although the OIC has refused to consent to a continuance, it has provided no reason for its objection, and will in reality suffer no prejudice from the approximately thirty-day delay. Further, although continuance of the trial will take Ms. Steele out of the confines of the Speedy Trial Act, Ms. Steele has waived her rights under the Act. Finally, although Ms. Steele is cognizant that a continuance will inconvenience the Court by disrupting its calendar, the continuance is absolutely necessary given her counsel's present circumstances.

As the Court is aware, the decision of whether a continuance should be granted rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964). A trial court abuses this discretion when it exercises an "unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for a delay." Slappy, 461 U.S. at 11-12.

The Ohio Matter, which was set before the trial date in this case, will take approximately four weeks to try, and there are circumstances in the case which warrant its being tried prior to the case at bar. The defendants in the Ohio Matter have been in pretrial home detention for seventeen months; Ms. Steele was released on personal recognizance. The Ohio Matter has been pending for seventeen months; this matter has been pending for less than sixty days. The Ohio Matter is complicated, with hundreds of exhibits, several experts on each side, and a co-defendant; this matter is not as complex. In the interests of justice, undersigned counsel respectfully suggests that the Ohio Matter should take priority for counsel and for the Court.

Nor will the OIC be prejudiced by continuance. The delay sought by Ms. Steele is a relatively short one, less than thirty days. There is no question as to the aging of evidence or unavailability of witnesses. Moreover, the OIC has investigated this case for more than a year. Ms. Steele has had only two months and has extremely limited resources, particularly when compared to those of the OIC.

As stated previously, Ms. Steele has chosen Ms. Luque to represent her in this matter, as is her Sixth Amendment right. United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 238, 739-40 (4^th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 988 (1974). The other attorneys at Reed Smith who have participated in the matter have done so in a limited manner, and only to assist Ms. Luque's pro bono representation of Ms. Steele, as have Mr. Marino and Ms. Watkins from Seyfarth, Shaw, who believe Ms. Steele is being unfairly prosecuted. It would deprive Ms. Steele of her Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice, as well as her right to effective assistance of counsel, to require Ms. Steele to be represented by someone other than Ms. Luque.

Nor is the case at bar ripe for trial within the next fourteen days. Rule 16 and Brady discovery is incomplete. Counsel is still reviewing and analyzing the OIC's voluminous production, is finalizing its pretrial motion on OIC jurisdiction, and is contemplating additional motions based on the late discovery. The OIC has yet to produce exhibits, witness lists, or Jenck's Act materials. Much work remains before either side, particularly Ms. Steele, can represent to the Court that they are prepared to proceed.

In sum, an approximately thirty-day continuance will serve to allow both the Ohio Matter and Ms. Steele's case to be tried by well-prepared and competent counsel on both sides, and it is in the interest of justice that this be the case. Undersigned counsel is aware that such a delay constitutes a burden on the Court's calendar, but respectfully suggests that the continuance is necessary despite this burden for the reasons set forth above, and will not abrogate Ms. Steele's right to a speedy trial because she is prepared to waive that right.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Court should enter an order continuing trial of this matter from March 30, 1999, until April 26, 1999, or the first available date for trial thereafter.

DATED: May 5, 1999

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Hearing, Motion For Continuance, and Memorandum of Law in Support thereof was served, via facsimile, on this 5th day of March, 1999, on the following:

Andrew L. Hurst

Upon consideration of Ms. Steele's Motion For Continuance, it is this _______ day of _____________, 1999, hereby

ORDERED that Ms. Steele's Motion is hereby GRANTED, and it is further

ORDERED that, in the interests of justice, trial of this matter will begin on _______________, 1999.

____________________________

Hon.

United States District Court

Judge