NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Court will hold a hearing on Julie Hiatt Steele’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment For Prosecutorial Misconduct: Ethical Violation, Steele Pretrial Motion No. 2, on Friday, February 26, 1999 at 9:00 a.m.

DATED: February 16, 1999

Julie Hiatt Steele, through undersigned counsel, hereby moves the Court to dismiss the indictment because it is irreversibly tainted by the ethical violations of the Office of Independent Counsel ("OIC") constituting prosecutorial misconduct. Because this conduct violated Ms. Steele's constitutional rights, rendered the grand jury proceedings fundamentally unfair, and substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict, dismissal of the indictment is the appropriate remedy. At a minimum, disqualification of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr and the OIC is required to ensure a fair prosecution of the charges set forth in the indictment.

In support of her Motion, Ms. Steele relies on the following Memorandum of Law.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum of Law, Ms. Steele respectfully requests the Court to dismiss the indictment or, in the alternative, disqualify Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr and the OIC from prosecution of the charges set forth in the indictment.

DATED: February 16, 1999

The indictment brought against Julie Hiatt Steele is irreversibly tainted by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr and the Office of Independent Counsel's ("OIC") pervasive ethical breaches constituting substantial prosecutorial misconduct. Mr. Starr's and the OIC's conflicts of interest and complete disregard for this court's ethical standards violated Ms. Steele's constitutional right to due process and render the entire grand jury proceeding fundamentally unfair.

Because of the severity and pervasiveness of this unethical behavior, and the resulting violation of Ms. Steele's fundamental rights, dismissal of the indictment is required. By dismissing the indictment, this Court will protect fundamental constitutional rights from being swept away in a political maelstrom and send a powerful message to the OIC that prosecutorial misconduct will not be tolerated in this district. At a minimum, this Court should disqualify Mr. Starr and the OIC attorneys from further prosecution of this case.

In May 1994, Paula Jones brought a civil sexual harassment suit against William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, in federal district court in Arkansas. Ms. Jones was represented in that lawsuit by Washington, D.C. attorneys Gilbert K. Davis and Joseph Cammarata. Following two years of litigation and appeals from the lower courts, Ms. Jones' attorneys appeared before the United States Supreme Court in January 1997 to argue that President Clinton was not immune from a civil lawsuit unrelated to his official presidential functions. Ms. Jones' lawyers were ultimately successful in their argument, and, in May 1997, the Supreme Court upheld Ms. Jones' right to take the President to court.

Throughout the lengthy appeals process leading to the Supreme Court argument, and the subsequent negotiations with Mr. Clinton's attorneys, Ms. Jones, and Messrs. Davis and Cammarata, were assisted by a cadre of attorneys who acted as advisors and counselors for their cause. Among these informal advisors were ideological opponents of Mr. Clinton's, conservative advocates, and, most notably, Kenneth Starr.

During the summer of 1994, Mr. Starr provided advice to Mr. Davis regarding Ms. Jones' ongoing suit against the President. Mr. Starr "believed the [Jones'] case had merit and counseled [Ms. Jones' lawyers] to move forward. Mr. Starr even met with Ms. Jones's attorneys on several occasions to discuss strategy and points of law related to the case. In addition to Mr. Starr himself, Mr. Starr's associates were involved with the Jones case, including Richard Porter, a partner of Mr. Starr's at the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis.

Like Mr. Starr, Mr. Porter gave Ms. Jones' advice through her lawyers on the case against the Mr. Clinton. According to Messrs. Davis and Cammarata's billing records, Mr. Porter provided strategic legal advice and written memoranda related to the case. Mr. Porter also was instrumental in introducing Ms. Jones' attorneys to a number of other like-minded lawyers who provided legal assistance and advice, among them Mr. Porter's former classmates at the University of Chicago, Jerome Marcus and Paul Rosenzeig.

Mr. Rosenzeig's recruitment by the Jones' lawyers is especially significant because Mr. Rosenzeig subsequently became one of Mr. Starr's deputy prosecutors at the OIC. It has been reported that Mr. Rosenzeig's connections to Ms. Jones' lawyers and advisors were used by the OIC to aid its investigation. Mr. Rosenzeig remained so closely connected to the individuals helping Ms. Jones that the events involving Monica Lewinsky -- the very basis for the OIC's jurisdiction -- were disclosed to him by Jones' advisors four days prior to their "official" disclosure to the OIC by Linda Tripp. Mr. Rosenzeig's contacts with Ms. Jones' lawyers, among other OIC conflicts of interest, have subsequently led to an official investigation of the OIC by the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility.

Mr. Starr's law firm, Kirkland & Ellis, through its attorney Daniel Attridge, confirmed in a February 1998 affidavit that some of the firm's attorneys were involved in the Jones case. According to Mr. Attridge's sworn statement, Kirkland & Ellis provided pro bono legal services to the Independent Women's Forum, one of the non-profit groups that planned to file a brief in support of Ms. Jones' cause. Similarly, Mr. Starr later confirmed that he had discussions with the Independent Women's Forum about filing an amicus brief in support of Ms. Jones' effort to maintain her lawsuit against President Clinton.

Mr. Starr was appointed on August 6, 1994, as Independent Counsel to investigate matters relating to the failed Whitewater land deal. On January 16, 1998, Mr. Starr requested and was granted expanded jurisdiction to investigate, among other things, whether persons suborned perjury, obstructed justice, intimidated witnesses or otherwise violated federal law in dealing with witnesses, potential witnesses or attorneys involved in Ms. Jones' lawsuit.

In seeking this expanded jurisdiction, Mr. Starr failed to notify Attorney General Janet Reno of his role in Ms. Jones' case. In testimony before the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, Mr. Starr attempted to explain this ethical breach as follows: ". . . it just frankly did not occur to me . . ." that conversations and meetings with Ms. Jones' attorneys, and that legal advice rendered to Ms. Jones through her attorneys, should have been disclosed to the Attorney General. The Department subsequently initiated an official investigation into possible OIC conflicts of interests based on these same contacts.

On the other hand, Ms. Steele has no connection to President Clinton, Paula Jones or the Jones v. Clinton case. The OIC's investigation of Ms. Steele, and the allegations set forth in her indictment, stem entirely from her relationship with Kathleen Willey. In early 1997, Willey asked Ms. Steele to lie to a reporter for Newsweek, who was then interviewing Willey in her attorney's office. Although Ms. Steele initially conveyed Willey's lie to the reporter off the record, when she later learned that he intended to publish the story, Ms. Steele informed him of her participation in the deception. Nevertheless, he published Willey's story and Ms. Steele's recantation in an August 1997 Newsweek article. Indictment at ¶ 12.

Later, Willey testified in a deposition in the Jones v. Clinton case, giving yet another version of the "grope" story. Shortly thereafter, President Clinton's lawyers asked Ms. Steele whether Willey had in fact, asked her to lie. It is this "lie" which is at the heart of Ms. Steele's indictment. When Ms. Steele confirmed that Willey had done so, the President's lawyers sought her affidavit. Ms. Steele subsequently gave them her affidavit after discovery had closed in Jones v. Clinton.

Mr. Starr testified before the Judiciary Committee on November 19, 1998. Mr. Starr freely appeared before the Judiciary Committee and was not in any way compelled to testify. He commented directly and specifically on matters involving Julie Hiatt Steele; including but not limited to, Ms. Steele's credibility, the OIC's ongoing investigation of Ms. Steele, and the merit of Ms. Steele's own statements. For instance, at one point in his testimony, Mr. Starr stated:

Mr. Starr, after admitting that he should not continue to comment on Ms. Steele, succumbed to the temptation to malign Ms. Steele further by testifying that:

Mr. Starr's prejudicial testimony and ethical violations did not go unnoticed. Mr. Starr's own ethics advisor, Sam Dash, resigned to protest Mr. Starr's improper actions. In his resignation letter, Mr. Dash's stated that Mr. Starr had finally gone too far:

Despite this criticism of Mr. Starr's improper testimony by his own ethics advisor, he was undeterred. Shortly after Mr. Starr testified about Ms. Steele, she became the first, and to date only, person to be indicted in the OIC's investigation of the Jones case.

The OIC's numerous ethical violations constitute egregious prosecutorial misconduct. Under Local Rule 83.1(I), the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility ("VCPR") establishes "[t]he ethical standards of this Court." The VCPR includes Canons, Ethical Considerations ("ECs"), and Disciplinary Rules ("DRs"). Canons set the standards of professional conduct; ECs provide aspirational objectives for the legal profession; but DRs, however, are "mandatory statements of the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to discipline." Personalized Mass Media Corp. v. Weather Channel, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 239, 242 (E.D. Va. 1995) (citing Estate of Andrews v. United States, 804 F. Supp. 820, 823 (E.D. Va. 1992)).

Canon 5 of the VCPR provides that "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client." Under the mandatory DRs of Canon 5, "a lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the representation of another client . . ." DR 5-105(B); see also DR5-105(B), D.C. Code of Prof'l Resp.

The District of Columbia has similar standards of professional conduct. Under District of Columbia Local Rule 706, violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct shall be grounds for discipline. Acts that violate the District of Columbia Code of Professional Responsibility, as adopted by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, constitute misconduct. United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 418 (1991).

Moreover, Department of Justice ("DOJ") regulations provide that a federal prosecutor shall not participate in a criminal prosecution if he has a personal or political relationship with "[a]ny person or organization which he knows has a specific and substantial interest that would be directly affected by the outcome of the investigation or prosecution." 28 C.F.R. 45.2.

Despite his prior involvement with Ms. Jones' lawsuit, Mr. Starr sought and was granted expanded jurisdiction to investigate alleged criminal violations committed by persons involved in that very case. Mr. Starr's role, and the role of his law firm, in Ms. Jones' sexual harassment suit constitutes an insurmountable conflict of interest in his investigation of the very same case as a prosecutor.

More fundamentally, his conflict compromises the original purpose of the Independent Counsel statute -- to ensure the independent administration of justice and avoid conflicts of interest. His relationship with the Jones case made it impossible for him to continue to exercise independent professional judgment as Independent Counsel once his jurisdiction was expanded to include charges in that same case. See DR 5-105; see also DR 5-105, D.C. Code of Prof'l Resp. Moreover, Mr. Starr's relationship with the Jones case clearly violated DOJ rules for prosecutorial conduct and compromised his ability to act as a fair-minded prosecutor. See 28 C.F.R. 45.2.

In addition to Mr. Starr's personal conflict of interest, a conflict of interest exists due to Mr. Starr's law firm's involvement in the Jones case. Anyone associated with Mr. Starr's law firm may not represent any person involved in the Independent Counsel investigation or prosecution. 28 U.S.C. § 594(j)(1)(1994); see also DR 5-105, D.C. Code of Prof'l Resp. Richard Porter, Mr. Starr's partner at the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis, like Mr. Starr, gave advice to Ms. Jones in regard to her claim against the President. Mr. Porter also served as a middle-man for Ms. Jones' lawyers, introducing them to several other outside attorneys who provided legal assistance.

Mr. Porter's and Kirkland & Ellis involvement in Ms. Jones' lawsuit violated the conflict of interest rules in the Independent Counsel statute, see 28 U.S.C. §594, as well as the ethical standards of this court. See DR 5-105. Together with Mr. Starr's personal conflicts of interest, these conflicts kept Mr. Starr from exercising the independent professional judgment required of federal prosecutors, particularly independent counsel.

DR 5-101(B) and DR 5-102(A) comprise the "witness-advocate" rule that prohibits attorneys from serving as both as an advocate and a witness in a case. See Estate of Andrews, supra. The witness-advocate rule, which reflects the inconsistent roles of an advocate and a witness, has deep roots in American law. See Personalized Mass Media Corp., supra at 242. When an attorney determines he ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client he shall withdraw from the trial. DR 5-102; see also DR 5-102, D.C. Code of Prof'l Resp. If an attorney learns he may be called as a witness by an adverse party, he may testify only until his testimony becomes prejudicial. DR 5-102(B); see also DR 5-102(B), D.C. Code of Prof'l Resp.

The witness-advocate rule is especially significant when applied to prosecutors. Prosecutors have a unique duty "to seek justice, not merely to convict," Young v. United States Ex Rel. Vuitton Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 803, and are held to the highest professional standards "to be worthy of public trust and confidence." United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 638, 643 (7^th Cir. 1982). Prohibiting prosecutors from acting as both advocate and witness serves broad interests in justice by (1) eliminating risk that a prosecutor will not be objective, (2) preventing a prosecutor's testimony from being given more weight due to his prestige and prominence, (3) avoiding the prosecutor's dual role from confusing the trier of fact, and (4) ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice. Id. at 642-43. The Department of Justice likewise has stringent procedures relating to Department personnel appearing as witnesses in lawsuits in which the United States is a party.

As noted above, Mr. Starr testified as a witness before the Judiciary Committee on November 19, 1998. Despite his ongoing investigation of Ms. Steele, Mr. Starr specifically and repeatedly referred to her. Mr. Starr's statements were not innocuous acknowledgements in response to questions pertaining to Ms. Steele, nor were they in any way inadvertent. To the contrary, Mr. Starr went so far as to directly and willfully attack Ms. Steele's credibility:

Mr. Starr's testimony regarding Ms. Steele is a clear violation of the witness-advocate rule. His testimony not only was prejudicial to the entire proceeding, the grand jury process, and the individual grand jurors, but it eroded any appearance of fairness and impartial justice to the national television audience who viewed it. Mr. Starr's "prestige" and "prominence" were beyond question, and he testified under oath and precisely in a manner guaranteed to influence the listener's view of Ms. Steele.

Local Criminal Rule 57 prohibits a prosecutor from making certain extra-judicial statements that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication. Statements prohibited by the rule include, the prosecutor's opinion of an accused's innocence or guilt, the merits of a case, or any statement made by the accused. See Local Criminal Rule 57(C). Rule 57 also specifically prohibits extra-judicial statements that are made pre-indictment during a criminal investigation or the grand jury process:

The District of Columbia Local Criminal Rule 308 is similarly clear and also specifically contemplates pre-trial remarks such as those made by Mr. Starr in this case.

The Supreme Court has recognized that extensive publicity in a criminal proceeding may compromise a defendant's constitutional rights. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) (noting that any highly publicized criminal trial could compromise defendant's right to a fair trial). Prejudice can be established by showing that the publicity pervaded the proceeding to such an extent that inherent prejudice is presumed. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 544 (1965)(prejudice presumed when courtroom proceedings televised despite no showing of identifiable prejudice to defendant); United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1485 (10^th Cir. 1995)(prejudiced presumed when jurors watched televised news program relating to trial).

Mr. Starr's statements before Congress violated this court's prohibition on extra-judicial statements. These statements referred directly to Ms. Steele and the merits of her case -- a clear violation of the ethical rules to which Mr. Starr is subject. See Va. Local Criminal Rule 57(B), supra; see also D.C. Local Criminal Rule 308(b), supra. Mr. Starr's testimony was aired before a national television audience and replayed on local news programs across America. Shortly after Mr. Starr's statements maligning Ms. Steele's credibility, a grand jury indicted Ms. Steele.

Under the mandatory disciplinary rules of Virginia, a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety. See DR 9-101. The culmination of the numerous ethical breaches by the OIC, and the highly sensational media coverage of these breaches, constitute actual impropriety.

This Court must dismiss the indictment because Ms. Steele's constitutional rights have been repeatedly violated by the OIC's unethical conduct. Prosecutorial misconduct of this magnitude violates a defendant's constitutional right to a grand jury indictment. The grand jury clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that a defendant will be indicted only upon an "informed and independent determination of a legally constituted grand jury." United States v. Sears, Roebuck and Company, Inc., 719 F.2d 1386, 1391 (9^th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984).

Constitutional error is found when "prosecutorial misconduct is so systematic and pervasive that it affects the fundamental fairness of the proceeding or if the independence of the grand jury is substantially infringed." United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091 (9^th Cir. 1992)(emphasis added)(citations omitted). While the dismissal of an indictment requires a showing of prejudice, prejudice is presumed in cases involving constitutional error. See Nova Scotia, at 256-58; United States v. Fenton, 1998 WL 356891, at *4 (W.D. Pa.)

Courts recognize the powerful influence of a prosecutor's comments and do not hesitate to reverse convictions when a prosecutor makes improper remarks to a jury. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1^st Cir. 1997)(reversing conviction because of prosecutor's improper comments regarding defendant's testimony); Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 712 (2^nd Cir. 1997)(reversing conviction because of prosecutor's improper comments regarding defendant's presence in courtroom); United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1502-03 (8^th Cir. 1996)(reversing conviction because of prosecutor's improper comments regarding defendant's race).

While a prosecutor's improper remarks during a closing argument are of serious concern, they pale in comparison to similar remarks made by a prosecutor pre-indictment. During a trial, defense counsel can respond to improper remarks, a jury can weigh them against a wide array of evidence, and a judge can provide a curative instruction. None of these protections are available to a defendant who is prejudiced by a prosecutor's improper and extremely public remarks prior to indictment.

One of the grand jury's principal purposes is to protect citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423 (citations omitted). Grand juries that become infected by bias or are otherwise defective cannot perform their vital protective function. As such, courts dismiss indictments that were tainted by a fundamentally unfair or structurally defective grand juries. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (dismissing indictment because of racial discrimination in selection of jurors); Ballard v. United States, 329 v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (dismissing indictment because of exclusion of women from grand jury).

In addition, both federal and Virginia state courts have acted decisively when prosecutors are found to have conflicts of interest. See Granger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4^th Cir. 1967) (vacating conviction on due process grounds in case in which prosecutor had conflict of interest due to his representation of wife in civil proceeding while prosecuting husband); Cantrell v. Virginia, 229 Va. 387 (1985)(reversing conviction because of private prosecutor's conflict of interest).

Mr. Starr's conflict of interest, extra-judicial statements, and sworn testimony maligning Ms. Steele made it impossible for the grand jury to remain unbiased. The cumulative effective of the OIC's numerous and varied ethical violations tainted the entire grand jury process. Not only was Ms. Steele's Fifth Amendment right to an unbiased grand jury violated, but the entire grand jury structure was tainted. While in some cases a prosecutor's ethical violations might not rise to the level required for dismissal of an indictment, see McDade, supra, at *6 n.3 (violation of 5^th Amendment does not go to the very foundation of the grand jury), the unique circumstances of this case compel an different result.

Mr. Starr, along with his colleague Mr. Porter and, indeed, his entire law firm, had a clear stake in the outcome of Ms. Jones's civil action against the President. This conflict of interest constitutes a serious ethical violation that, standing alone, requires dismissal of the indictment. But Mr. Starr's conflict also, more tellingly, illuminates the subsequent ethical breaches by the OIC in violation of Ms. Steele's right to due process.

Impaired by this conflict, Mr. Starr commented directly on Ms. Steele's credibility in his November 19, 1998 testimony before Congress. This violation of the well-established prohibition on a prosecutor acting both as an advocate and a witness was aired on national television and not surprisingly, led to Ms. Steele's indictment less than a few weeks later. Significantly, the indictment directly challenges Ms. Steele's credibility, and only her credibility, just as Mr. Starr had done in his testimony about her.

Mr. Starr's impropriety was so egregious that it even resulted in the resignation of Mr. Starr's own ethics counsel. Mr. Starr's conflicts of interest, violations of federal prosecutorial policy, and clear disregard for the ethical standards of this Court violated Ms. Steele's right to due process and require this Court to dismiss Ms. Steele's indictment.

Even in the absence of constitutional violations, a court may dismiss an indictment pursuant to its supervisory powers, if the prosecutor's conduct "substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict, or if there is a 'grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations." United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46-47.

The pervasive ethical violations of the OIC irreparably tainted the entire grand jury proceeding and unfairly prejudiced Ms. Steele in the grand jury process. In view of the fact that Ms. Steele is the only party indicted in the entire investigation, it is clear that Mr. Starr's improper and unethical conduct and conflicts of interest has substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict. See Williams, supra, at 46-47. See also Roberts, supra (overturning conviction because of prosecutor's improper comments); Portuondo, supra (same); Cannon, supra (same).

If the indictment is not dismissed, the OIC should be disqualified because it is irrevocably tainted by the ethical violations committed by Mr. Starr and the appearance thereof. These violations will infect the entire trial and taint any final resolution by the Court.

Courts have broad discretion in deciding whether an attorney should be disqualified. Sherrod v. Berry, 589 F.Supp. 433, 437 (N.D.Ill. 1984). "Doubts as to whether an attorney should be disqualified are to be resolved in favor of disqualification." Manoir-Electroalloys Corp. v. Amalloy Corp., 711 F.Supp. 188, 194 (D.N.J. 1989). Prosecuting attorneys, including United States Attorneys, have been disqualified from the prosecution of certain cases under a number of circumstances. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 700 F.Supp. 626 (D.Puerto Rico 1988)(United States Attorney disqualified from case in which his brother was participating as a government witness in a grand jury investigation); United States v. Omni International Corporation, 634 F.Supp. 1414 (D.Md. 1986) (Assistant United States Attorney, Special Agent and Revenue Agent involved in an investigation and prosecution disqualified after numerous acts of misconduct).

Government attorneys and agents are properly disqualified from further participation in grand jury investigations and prosecutions where other measures are insufficient to remedy the attorneys' violations. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings John Doe # 462, an assistant United States Attorney and two law enforcement agents read attorney-client privileged documents which were inadvertently not redacted from a defendant’s document production by a United States District Court. 757 F.2d 600, 601 (4th Cir. 1985). The District Court found that the government’s proposed remedy (no further use and return of the documents)

Id. at 602. The Court then disqualified both the attorney and the two agents, and required the three to file all notes in connection with review of the documents under seal. Id. See also United States v. Catalanotto, 468 F.Supp. 503 (D.Ariz. 1978)(disqualifying an entire office of the United States Attorney because of privileged information known by an Assistant United States Attorney who formerly represented a defendant).

It is an appropriate remedy to disqualify attorneys for breaches of ethical standards. See McCallum v. CSX Transp., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 104 (M.D.N.C. 1993). Courts have broad discretion to disqualify attorneys to prevent not only real conflict of interest, but apparent conflict of interest. McGlothin v. Connors, 142 F.R.D. 626 (W.D. Va. 1992).

The pervasive ethical violations in this case make it impossible to remedy the wrong by any other means than disqualifying the entire OIC. Both the reality and the appearance of serious impropriety require this court to exercise its power over members of the bar and disqualify Mr. Starr and the OIC. Furthermore, Ms. Steele welcomes a full and fair investigation of this matter by the DOJ, and she would welcome their review of this indictment.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Court must dismiss the indictment in the above-captioned matter, or in the alternative, disqualify Kenneth Starr and the OIC .

DATED: February 16, 1999

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct: Ethical Violations, Steele Pretrial Motion No. 2, and Memorandum of Law in Support thereof was served, via hand-delivery, on this 16th day of February, 1999, on the following:

Andrew L. Hurst

Upon consideration of Ms. Steele's Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Prosecutorial Misconduct: Ethical Violations, it is this ____ day of __________ 1999, hereby

ORDERED that Ms. Steele's Motion is hereby GRANTED, and it is further

ORDERED that the indictment in this matter is dismissed.

____________________________

Hon.

United States District Court

Judge